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I. Introduction 
The purpose of these notes is comparative/pedagogical but not polemical:- to compare 
fundamental notions of category, syntactic structure, and syntactic function in the two 
theories for the sake of understanding them, not to argue that one theory is preferable to the 
other (though that might be an enterprise which could eventually benefit from this 
comparison). These notes are written mainly for the purpose of getting clear(er) in my own 
mind, and explaining to my students, what the differences are and are not. Only the most 
fundamental syntactic notions are treated in this version, but it might well be profitable to 
pursue this study to examine more complex aspects of the theories as well. 
For the sake of concreteness, it might seem appropriate to cite particular instantiations 
of X-Bar theory and of Categorial Grammar as the basis fpr my comparison. However, there 
are multiple variants of both theories that are currently of interest to linguists, and. the 
fundamental level of this discussion would appear not to require differentiation .among 
variants (except a few points as explicitly noted), so I will not single out any particular 
versions. One could take Gazdar, Klein, Pullum and Sag (I 985) as a prototype of the X-bar 
theories I have in mind and the linguistic papers in Oehrle et al. (1988) as a prototype for 
categorial grammars, but I do not pretend to discuss either of these literally. 
2. Lexical vs phrasal categories 
CG has no such distinction between the lexical and phrasal categories as it appears in 
X-Bar theory (e.g. V vs. V', the former corresponding to a node in a tree that necessarily 
dominates only lexical material, the latter one that necessarily does not immediately dominate 
lexical material). One and the same category of CG may· contain both basic expressions 
('lexical items') and syntactically complex expressions as members (e.g. walk, persuade Mary 
to leave, both of category VP). However, one can distinguish in CG, as Montague did in PTQ, 
between Basic Expressions of a category A, denoted BA, and Phrases of the same category A, 
the relationship between the two kinds of categories 1:ieing defined by the rule . 
(1) For all Cat A, Basic Expressions of A~ Phrases of A 
(for all categories A--it being understood that the syntactic rules then recursively define PA 
for all A, using the members of A defined by (I) as the· base for the recursion). It is obvious 
that any expression f3 analyzed by a CG as of category X will correspond in an X-Bar analysis 
to (i) a phrasal node XP immediately dominating a lexical node X which in turn immediately 
dominates /3, if /3 e Bx as well as /3 e Px, or (ii) a phrasal node XP dominating category nodes 
of the expressions from which f3 was produced (i.e. its immediate constituents) if /3 € P but 
not f3 e Bx- Unless X-Bar theory insists on the distinction between (2a) and (2b) being maJe--or 
that (2a) rather than (2b) is necessary for other reasons, the two kinds of description would 
seem equivalent, ceteris paribus. 
(2b) VP(2•> ;z,_ 
V' NP V~P 
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This kind of distinction apparently cannot be made in categorial grammar, because 
basic expressions cannot be operated on by syntactic rules (e.g. coordinated) independently of 
their membership in phrasal categories. Though one often sees (2a) in X-Bar analyses, from 
the point of view of categorial grammar it is necessary to write it only because X-Bar theory 
does permit the category of transitive verbs (or ditransitive verbs, or other subcategories of 
verbs differing in their complements) to be a phrasal category. And indeed it will apparently 
always turn out' that analyses like (2a) would be unproblematical in CG if they could be 
viewed as 'abbreviations' for analyses like (2b), since there will always be phrasal ,categories 
in CG of the kind that need to be conjoined (or otherwise combined): according to the above 
described mapping between the two theories, every lexical category has a phrasal counterpart 
in CG (even categories like Determiner and Complementizer), so there would be far more of 
them than X-Bar theory allows. Lest this seem like a source for a potential economy argument 
against CG, recall that the lexical (as opposed to phrasal) categories postulated in the above 
mapping are 'not really there' in CG. Any possible empirical arguments on the inadequacy of 
CG on this point would apparently have to hang on showing analyses like (2a) as distinct from 
(2b) really are necessary (and my hunch is this is not likely). Note also that such an argument 
would probably have to involve syntax alone and not morphology (i.e. not a case where CG 
could counter with an independently-well-motivated distinction between lexical and syntactic 
rules, or between morphological and syntactic operations or rules). 
3. Bar-levels 
CG does not. have (and apparently cannot have in general) anything amounting to a 
distinction between X' and a corresponding X" category (I will henceforth write XP for the 
(two-bar-level) X" category but continue to use X' for the one-bar-level) nor any distinctions 
among greater numbers of bar levels. There is traditionally a phrasal-and-lexical category 
within NP that functions like N' (called CN), but it is important to realize it has this status 
because of the unusual relationship between (common) noun and NP(= Montague's T-phrase) 
within CG, which is neither parallel to the relationship between proper noun and NP nor 
between lexical verbs (of various subcategories) and VP in CG. CN is usually treated as a 
primitive category; it is predicative (like VP, denoting a set--or in some theories a property), 
not individual-denoting (like 'first-order' proper names or pronouns), nor having the same kind 
of reference as NP (if these are generalized quantifiers). The syntactic relationship between 
CN and NP is of course mediated by assigning determiners to category NP/CN (which makes 
Determiner neither parallel to modifiers nor to auxiliary verbs categorially, but more like a 
functor like VP or Comp or TV or Prep), One has therefore a distinction between coordination 
at the CN level and coordination at the NP level, between NP anaphora (ii) and CN anaphora 
(one), and between modifiers of CN (adjectives, restrictive relative clauses, and some PPs) and 
modifiers of NPs (probably non-restrictive relative clauses)--all the things that a distinction 
between N' and NP buys you in X-bar theory. 
The thing to remember is that nothing analogous to the category CN exists within VPs 
or PPs or APs, according to most CG analyses. To be sure, there are predicted to.be multiple 
hierarchically embedded 'levels' within such phrases in CG, because of t.he possibility of 
adding a modifier to create a higher phrase of the same category, but these are phrases 'at the 
same bar level'. And within VPs (and some APs and even PPs) there can be multiple arguments 
of the head V (etc.), which generate internal hierarchical structure (this time, structure often 
NOT found in the corresponding X-bar analysis), but these are not analogous to V' (or A' or 
P'--if it exists) as found in X-bar theory either. 
As it has sometimes been suggested, N' appears to be better motivated empirically than 
V' (or A', etc.)--i.e. motivated as genuinely distinct from the corresponding 2-bar level category, 
even to the point of causing doubt in the existence of V' etc.--this might be a place where CG 
could try to argue for empirical superiority. 
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On the other hand, an apparent major difficulty for CG lies in the relationship among 
proper nouns, common nouns, and NPs: accounting for the distributional and morphological 
similarities among these expressions, in a way compatible with the 'standard' CG category 
assignments (i.e. those required by their semantics), since these categories are not 
'automatically' connected in the way that they are in X·bar theory. How is it that both proper 
names and common nouns (but not determiners) are heads of their phrases for purposes of 
morphology, but determiners are (probably?) not, for example? (See below on 'heads'.) Now, 
semanticists often have a story to tell about the complicated semantic relationship among these 
three categories, which can be ontogenetic (Partee and Rooth 1983, Dowty 1982, .Ladusaw, 
p.c.)--i.e. an explanation in terms of the need for children to be able to acquire language in 
steps) or yet more abstract and intricate, in terms of 'fluid' types (Partee 1987),. but it remains 
to be seen how this can be elaborated and motivated in such a way as to cash in on the 
morphosyntactic generalizations about NPs that X-bar theory claims to capture (or 
alternatively, to be argued that the strong parallels between NP and other phrasal categories 
that X-bar predicts are actually somewhat otherwise). 
In summary, X-Bar theory postulates that (at least) this kind of structure is common 
to NP, VP, AP, (and maybe Sor other categories). 
While CG offers instead this kind of 'schema', in which A 1,...An are arguments of XP, 
and XP\XP1,...XP\XPmare modifiers of XP: 
CG would seem to agree with X,Bar theory on the cross-categorial relationships among 
X, X' and Complement, and also that modifiers can be added.at multiple levels to create a 
phrase of the same level, and similarly for coordination, but differ in that (i) if Determiner 
is a Specifier, then its relationship to NP. and N' (= CN) can be reconciled in CG with what 
X-bar · theory says about it, but that this 'specifier' relationship probably does not exist 
elsewhere; (ii) in CG auxiliary verbs are not specifiers of VP but are the heads of VPs taking 
other VPs as complements (and GPSG agrees with this position of course, though it adopts 
X-bar theory in other ways)--a kind of possible exception being found in the 'type-raised 
modal' analysis of Bach (1979) and Dowty (1979) (modals as (S\NP)/VP, all other verb phrases 
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beirig VP of a lower type) which gives modals and possibly all tensed auxiliaries a status 
something like 'Specifier'; (iii) CG, unless its 'binary' nature is diluted by the addition of 
flattening principles, will have as many additional constituent groupings within an XP as the 
head of XP has arguments numbering more than two (i.e. give Mary a book has an additional 
sub-constituent not found in see Mary). 
4. Grammatical categories vs grammatical functions 
4.1. fum 
(It's not completely clear to me what status 'head' has in this typology, but I'm 
including it here anyway.) · 
The obvious way to·think of heads in terms of CG is that functors are uniformly heads 
of the constituents they form with their arguments if this worked, it would be a great 
advantage of CG, since you.could in effect predict from semantic consi_derations (sometimes) 
what the head was going to be (or vice-versa from morphosyntactic ones)--a very highly 
predictive feature of a theory, potentially .. 
The equally obvious problem is modifiers: they are functors, but traditional usage of 
the term 'head' (cf. Zwicky 198S, Gazdar et al. 198S) demands we treat their arguments as 
heads, not modifiers. (Bob Carpenter in his dissertation (Carpen·ter 1988) develops a theory 
where all such generalizations are stated in terms of 'functor', without distinguishing 
modifiers from 'real' heads; Bach (1983) also treats the agreement and government properties 
of modifiers without formally distinguishing between them and other functors--cf. below.) 
One could try defining head by saying (making the type-token distinction only 
implicitly; in a way familiar to linguists): · 
(5) In [ A/B B I of category A, A/B is the head except where A = B; then, B is the head. 
The problem with this is there are cases where A does happen to equal B, yet it's obvious A/B 
is the head and B its complement,-for example auxiliary verbs take VP to form a VP; but the 
auxiliary verb is traditionally considered the head. Equi verbs are similar. Now maybe the 
subcategory is different in most cases, but there may be a few base-base cases like go soak your 
head, run get the beer, and there are certainly transitive counterparts like help John wash the 
dishes, see Mary win the race, so I wouldn't want to pin my definition on the same-subcategory/ 
different-subcategory distinction. This implies 'head' must be a syntactic primitive in some 
sense or other, if modifiers need to be explicitly singled out. 
4.2. Inherent functor features 
One interesting question for formalizing a definition of category in CG that allows a 
'modern' system of features is whether a functor category A/B can have features qua functor 
category, or only features defined for A (as part of its definition of its result category) and 
features defined for B (ditto argument category)--though of course each of these can be 
r.ecursively complex in the same way: this theory implies all your features are ultimately 
defined on one of the primiiive categories, so there are no features peculiar to complex 
categories. (Carpenter, at least, uses such a restricted theory of features.) The other theory 
would merely regard 'Argument Category'. and 'Result Category' as two category-valued 
features that go; into defining a category (like SLASH in GPSG); possibly among other features 
as well. (Bach 1983 explicitly allows for 'inherent' features for complex categories, though he 
'doesn't actually use .them, though Zeevat, Klein and Calder 1987, Uszkoreit 1986, and 
Karttunen 1986 do make use of inherent features.) · 
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Now although it might be technically possible to treat 'head' as a feature definable on 
a primitive category (still without distinguishing A/A from A/B), I believe the definition 
would be awkward and would have unintuitive consequences. But rather than open the door 
to just any arbitrary inherent functor features, maybe one should consider (for the time being) 
'head', alongside 'direction of slash', which is likewise necessarily an inherent functor feature 
if it exists at all, to be the only inherent features. 
A simple way to formalize such a theory would be as follows: 
(6) ,. The Primitive categories ere .... (finite list). 
2. If A and B are any cateeories, A/B and A\B are categories. 
3. If A is a category, At/A and A\\A are categories. 
The idea is that A//A is the category of modifiers--each syntactically distinct but of the same 
semantic type as the corresponding A/A (where the second A is a complement). 'Head' is then 
defined by saying: 
(7) (i) in tA/B Bl, A/B is the head, and 
(ii) in tA;f/Aj Ail, Aj is the head. 
(This is of course a disjunctive definition--as Venneman and Barlow's definition also is, as 
pointed out by Hawkins 1984 (see Hoeksema p. 59)--but that would not be too bad if it turned 
out that one needed to ascribe properties to one of the two subtypes separately from the other.) 
Note also the Greenberg universal word order tendency is easily described as a t~ndency to put 
heads and non-heads in the same order (i.e. in VO languages, functors tend to precede 
arguments, but modifiers tend to follow arguments; vice-versa for OV's.) In describing 
agreement and government in morphology, one would then want to treat A/B and A//B 
differently; cf. discussion of Bach (1983) below. 
A more difficult question is whether the notion 'head' is really needed in a categorial 
theory of syntax. Pace Zwicky (1985), Bach (1983) argues that the notion 'head' is unnecessary 
for describing generalizations about inflectional morphology involving agreement, government, 
and selection in a categorial grammar with a well-developed system of morphosyntactic and 
morphological features, and he provides a significant fragment of modern German inflectional 
morphology and syntax formalized in this theory. Briefly, Bach's system works as follows. 
Morphosyntactic features are defined (essentially, though not in these terms) as attribute-
value pairs (i.e. pairs consisting of a feature and its (unique) feature-value), and primitive 
categories are sets of "these. A functor category A/B is then defined as an ordered pair 
consisting of a set of argument feature-value pairs (defining B) followed by a set of result 
feature-value pairs (defining A). Bach's general form of a syntactic rule incorporates 
principles of Government, Agreement and Inheritance ('Percolation') (cf. p. 79) and is stated 
as in (8), which is taking as recursively defining F(x), the morphological form of every derived 
expression x: 
(8) If a: r A/B, P E B, snd o is the associated syntactic operation, 
then 	 6 • A, where 6 = 
o(G(a), H(/J)) and 
F(6) = I(F(a), F(/J)) 
where: 
G = agreement and ..,.t be a function on F(/J)  
H = goverrtDent and n,st be"" function on F(cz)  
I = percolation and ..,.t be a function on (F(cz), F(/J))  
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··In other words, the functor expression a·(in A/B) will, in the conibined·expression, 
acquire 'agreement' morphological features that depend on features of its argument /3 (cf. 
Keenan's principle 'functors agree with their arguments'), and the argument expression /3 (in 
B) will acquire features governed by its functor a. In addition, the derived expression can 
'inherit'· features from both inputs: Bach's principle for this (cf. p. 81) says, roughly, that if 
the result category shares some feature(s) with the argument category, then the feature values 
of these shared features are inherited from the argument to the result; the feature values 
defining the category of the resulting expression are otherwise those specified in the result-
category symbol of the functor (i.e. A in A/B). 
In this system, endocentric modifiers are simply stipulated to have the feature set 
<fl, II>, i.e. no government features and no (lexically inherent) agreement features: then in the 
context of this system, they are 'completely transparent with respect to the features of their 
arguments'. 
In fact, we can almost take the feature set <fl, fl> as defining an endocentric modifier 
(and therefore indirectly determining 'headn: we cannot quite, because there is nothing in 
Bach's theory which insures that only expressions of A/A receive this feature set, rather than, 
say some expression of A/B for A ,f, B (which would be rather heads of non-endocentric 
constructions that just happen not to govern any features or have any inherent features with 
which other functors must agree). So (endocentric) modifiers must be expressions of A/A or 
A\A which have features <II, fl>, and heads can in turn be defined in terms of these. The 
question to ask is, does Bach miss any generalizations by not being able to refer to heads 
directly? Within the context of his theory, it is not obvious that he ·does. That should be a 
starting point for a close examination of this issue, which is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. Carpenter's treatment should provide a second example, formalized in a somewhat 
different way. Note that Zwicky (1985) (like Hoeksema 1985) is concerned with 'head' in 
derivational morphology as well as inflectional morphology and syntax, whereas Bach (and 
probably Carpenter) is/are not. 
4.3. Grammatical functions 
Much traditional grammatical wisdom has it that grammatical categories (noun, NP, 
Adverb, PP, etc.) and grammatical functions (subject, direct object, modifier, time adverbial, 
free adjunct, etc.) are distinct notions and should not be confused; some linguists (Arnold 
Zwicky, p.c.) would still seem to want to give such a principle the status of an a priori 
methodological assumption that is fixed before questions of the form of a linguistic theory can 
begin to be discussed. (Grammatical functions are of course taken to be definable in terms of 
other notions, such as constituent structure and linear order, in some theories but as primitives 
in others, such as relational grammar and LFG, but this statement applies equally to both kinds 
of theories.) However, categorial grammar would seem to ignore this boundary between 
category and function, since it provides char.acterizations of at least some grammatical 
functions (and some would argue, of all grammatical functions necessary in linguistic theory: 
Dowty 1982) in its category assignments and constituent structures. 
For expressions used as arguments, the grammatical function of the expression is 
determined not by the category of the argument itself but by the functor that is combined 
with it in a particular sentence: below are some examples. Note two important caveats here: 
we say 'expression used as argument' and not 'argument category', since expressions of the 
same category, say the 'NP' category S/VP, can be used sometimes as arguments and sometimes 
as functors by the same grammar; similarly, position in the grammatical structure of a sentence 
is relevant, since argument expressions of the same category can have multiple grammatical 
functions within a single sentence. English worq order is used for the sake of familiarity 
below, but it is to be understood that the definitions are essentially in terms of functor-
argument relations, not linear order. 
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For expressions used as functors in a particular situation, on the other hand, 
grammatical function (or at 'least part of it) is defined by category. There are two main kinds 
of these: modifier of A, where the functor is A// A or A\\A, and cases where the functor is a 
non-modifier. In that case, there may be some traditional name for the functor's grammatical 
function (such as 'predicate') but in most cases there will not, a traditional term existing only 
for the corresponding subcategorization frame, if even that (as in the case of the grammatical 
function of (VP/VP)/NP in [(VP/VP)NP NP]). Because grammatical category and grammatical 
function must coincide for functors, a functor expression which has more than one 
'grammatical function' must be assigned to more than one syntactic category, e.g. VP-
modifying adverbs and S-modifying adverbs must be assigned to different categories (cf. just 
below); this characteristic has been viewed by some as an undesirable property of CGs. 
(9) 	 E,._les of gr11111111tical f<11Ctions defined by categorial gr11111111r (categories used as variables over 
expressions) : 
a. In I NP NP\S l, NP has the gr8111118tfcal function subject and NP\S has the function predicate. 
b. lr, C VP/NP NP l, NP has the granmatical function direct object and VP/NP has the 
function transitive verb (phrase). 
c. In C (XP\\XP)INP NP l, NP has the function object of prepositi'on. 
d. In I VP/VP VP l, VP has the function VP conplement. 
e. In [ VP/S' S' ] , S' hes the function sentential conplement. 
f. In [ S S\\S l, S\\S has the function· sentential modifier. 
g. In I VP VP\\VP l, VP\\VP has the function VP modifier. 
h. In I CN CN\\CN. l, CN\\CN has the function noun modifier. 
(The list is not exhaustive). Some familiar grammatical categories do not appear as such in 
CG: for example, Adverb, Adverb Phrase, Preposition, and Prepositional Phrase do not exist 
in exactly parallel form in CG: rather, there. are only, the phrasal categories S,modifier (S\\S), 
VP-modifier (VP\\VP), and so on, each of which ma:y contain both solitary lexical expressfons 
C'S-adverbs', 'VP-adverbs'), as well as complex phrases consisting of an adverb and modifier 
('Adverb Phrase'), a preposition and object (e.g .. ((S\\S)/NP NP], a 'Prepositional Phrase'), a 
preposition and two complements ([(VP\\VP)/NP)/Adj NP Adj], e.g. with the presideni absent) 
or a sentence and adverbial. subordinating conjunction (e.g. [(S\\S)/S SJ, an 'ad'\'erbial 
subordinate clause'). JJowever, we can usually give cross-categorial characterizations in CG 
that correspond to the traditional classes, e.g. the category 'Preposition' can be said to 
correspond to (X\\X)/NP in CG, i.e. prepositions are words that combine with a following NP 
to form a modifier of any category. It could conceivably be regarded as a deficiency of CG 
that it 'predicts' that (some or all) prepositions could idiosyncratically form modifiers of 
certain categories but not others (say of CN and S but not VP), whereas it may be a (nearly 
or absolutely) universal fact about languages that in any language which has the category at 
all (cf. Schachter 1985), PPs modify S, VP, CN and probably various subcategories of these 
indiscriminately. Of course, many lexical items generalize with greater or. lesser productivity 
across various grammatical (sub-)categories, and the means ·for describing.this will have to 
be adopted in any: eyent (and various such systems have already been proposed),' so it's not 
clear, any importanf generalization .need be lost if one appeals to schema such as (X\\X)/NP 
as lexical categories. On the other hand, other kinds of modifier (adverb and adverbial 
subordinate clauses) are now known to need to be divided into 'VP-Adverbs' vs.,'S-Adverbs' 
for various descriptive reasons (Stalnaker and Thomason 1973, McConnell-Ginet 1982, Ernst, 
ms.), so it's clear these kinds of modifiers have to be kept distin.ct iii general.. · 
So far, however,. there is no real problem for •the. clear-cut distinction between 
grammatical category and grammatical function: ·even. if certain categorial relationships 
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'correspond' to ·definitions of grammatical functions, the purist can maintain that the actual 
'grammatical functions' themselves can still be regarded as of a different kind, on a different 
plane, as it were. If a problem arises, it would probably be with phrases such as every Thursday 
in the context (10): · 
(10) 	 Mary met John every Thursday in the garden  
Thursday nx,rnlng  
th Is Thursday  
the fl rst Thursday  
after Easter  
One can imagine a purist insisting that the phrases every Thursday etc. belong to the 
category NP (and to no other category) because (i) they have the internal syntax of a NP, and 
(ii) they share ordinary NP distribution (e.g. This Thursday is my birthday); the 'adverb-like 
quality' of this phrase, it would be argued, is a matter of grammatical function, not 
grammatical category, and it would be a confusion of category with function to call these 
Adverb Phrases (or NPs exhaustively dominated by AdvP). 
However, not just any NP can appear here (•Mary met John a false proposition in the 
garden), but only one referring to an interval of time; note also that a few temporal phrases 
require a preposition on or in in such contexts (Mary met John •(in) January in the garden) and 
on (or during) can occur optionally with all of the 'bare NP' phrases. Since these are clearly 
adjuncts, by their distribution and by their semantics, CG requires us to assign them to a 
modifier category such as S\\S or VP\\VP (though of course they may be derived from NPs 
by an 'adverbialization' rule or by combining with a 'phonologically null' preposition): the 
option of calling them 'NPs' apparently does not exist in this theory. If this is indeed a case 
where phrase structure grammars either demand assignment to category NP or offer an 
analytic choice between NP and an adverbial category, then some might want to argue that 
CG here forces the correct choice. (See Mccawley 1988 for detailed discussion of two further 
views on this data; note that, like CG, Mccawley takes the 'external syntax' of adverbially-
used NPs as relevant to determining their category, not just their internal syntax.) 
s. Category raising'and head-agreement-government generalizations 
Systems of categorial grammar are of course now widespread in which so-called 
'Category Raising' takes place (several examples are in Oehrle et al. 1988); either as a lexical 
process (i.e. expressions are entered in the higher type in the lexicon, but no general rule exists 
for changing an arbitrary category) or as an unrestricted 'syntactic' (and possibly recursively 
self-feeding) process. Category Raising reverses the functor-argument relationship between 
two expressions and so would wreak havoc with any generalizations about agreement and 
government in terms of category, unless countermeasures of some kind are taken. 
s.1. Type polymorphism 
There are basically two· ways to have the categorysraising cake and eat it too: first, one 
can relegate all type-raising to the semantics and so leave the true syntactic categories 
unaffected: this is sometimes called the 'type polymorphism' approach (see e.g. Partee 1987). 
For example if the fundamental form of the grammar has the categories e (name) and S\e 
(VP), and if by type-raising the category e is reinterpreted as denoting functions from S\e 
denotations to S denotations (NPs, in their semantic role as quantifiers), then for syntactic 
purposes S\e nevertheless continues to count as 'functor' and e as 'argument'. This might 
appear to be a strange strategy to a logician working with categorial grammar, since for her 
the whole point of using the categorial notation to name categories is that the logical type of 
the category is automatically made apparent. But for linguists interested in the natural 
language generalizations of word order and morphology that on the one hand seem sensitive 
to the functor-argument distinction in a basic way but are apparently unaffected by type· 
raising (if semanticists are right in identifying the points at which it occurs), this is a natural 
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kind of theory to pursue (even if we turn out to need a 'double' notation for categories and 
types of expressions to a void confusion). 
5.2. 'Structure-preserving' category raising 
Another possibility would be to incorporate category raising as an operation which does 
indeed change syntactic category but try to add to this a mechanism for making systematic 
concurrent changes in the organization of agreement and government morphology for that 
category, etc. so as to preserve the apparent morphological and syntactic relationships among 
expressions that existed before category raising--much as Dowty's (1989) analysis of non-
constituent conjunction carefully preserves word order in spite of category raising. This looks 
less practical on the face of it, but who knows whether it could be made workable in some 
reasonably elegant and ingenious way? 
6. Other topics 
As mentioned at the beginning of these notes, only the most fundamental properties of 
the two approaches are trea.ted here. A full comparison of them would necessarily involve a 
number of other issues which are m·ore complex, because language itself is more complex in 
these phenomena, because there is ·not a single approach in categorial grammar (or in X-bar 
theories) but several mutuaHy incompatible methods, or because semantic as well as syntactic 
issues are involved. These include but probably should not be limited to: 
i. the use of context-free operations only vs. use of more complex operations such as 
'wrapping' (cf. Bach 1984). · 
ii. (closely related) the use of non-context free operations vs. the use of metarules and 
'flattening' rules to capture discontinuous (bounded) dependencies. 
iii. The use of functional composition in CG to capture non-normal constituents, as in clause 
union or non-constituent coordination, vs. ways of describing these in X-1lar theories. 
iv. The use of feature-passing vs. movement transformations vs. functional composition to 
describe unbounded dependencies. · 
v. The use of unification in some versions of CG and HPSG vs. other methods of feature 
matching. · 
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